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THOUGHINTELLECTUAL FREEDOM defies precise 
definition, the right to seek answers to the questions that the mind 
propounds and to be stimulated to ask more questions must be in-
cluded in our attempts at definition, Included must be the right to be 
challenged by encountering alien, even offensive, ideologies. Included 
must be the duty to seek such challenge, for only a belief which has 
been challenged is held with any kind of certainty. Included must 
be the right to encounter not only the great minds of the past and 
the great minds of the present, but also the second rate, the third rate, 
the mediocre, and even the inferior minds. Included must be the right 
to read what they have produced, to be stimulated, moved, repelled 
by their ideas, their portrayal of life, and their reaction to the human 
situation. Included must be the right of access to a rich and varied 
collection in every one of our public libraries, a collection, not only 
of books, magazines and pamphlets, but also of tapes, pictures, films, 
recordings and all other material from which knowledge can be de- 
rived. The public library, accordingly, must be the bastion of intel- 
lectual freedom. 
The mortal enemy of intellectual freedom is, of course, censorship. 
Censorship not only stifles the opinions and theories which have been 
expressed, but also those which might come to life if eager minds 
were allowed to receive the suppressed ideas, to elaborate them, or 
to refute them. Censorship ever leaves us unsure of the beliefs we 
hold, for, as John Stuart Mill pointed out: 
The beliefs which we have most warrant for, have no safeguard to 
rest on, but a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them 
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unfounded. If the challenge is not accepted, or is accepted and the 
attempt fails, we are far enough from certainty still; but we have 
done the best that the existing state of human reason admits of; 
we have neglected nothing that could give the truth a chance of 
reaching us . . . this is the amount of certainty attainable by a 
fallible being, and it is the sole way of attaining it.l 
Public libraries in this nation are, by and large, governed by boards 
of trustees. These boards are either appointed or elected. In some 
instances city managers or other trained officials prefer to deal di-
rectly with the librarians without the interposition of a policy-making 
body. But whatever the nature of the governing body, its function is 
a public trust and its obligations include employing a competent and 
qualified librarian as well as determining and adopting written policies 
to govern the operations and programs of the library. The most im-
portant policy a governing body must make is that involving book 
selection. The following statement is an example of a book selection 
policy which clearly sets responsibilities and fulfills a board's obliga- 
tion to intellectual freedom: 
The board of this library recognizing the pluralistic nature of this 
community and the varied backgrounds and needs of all citizens, 
regardless of race, creed or political persuasion, declares as a matter 
of book selection policy that: 
1. Books and/or library material selection is and shall be vested in 
the librarian and under his direction such members of the profes- 
sional staff who are qualified by reason of education and training. 
Any book and/or library material so selected shall be held to be 
selected by the board. 
2. Selection of books and/or other library material shall be made 
on the basis of their value of interest, information and enlightenment 
of all people of the community. No book and/or library material 
shall be excluded because of the race, nationality or the political 
or social views of the author. 
3. This board believes that censorship is a purely individual mat- 
ter and declares that while anyone is free to reject for himself books 
which he does not approve of, he cannot exercise this right of 
censorship to restrict the freedom to read of others. 
4. This board defends the principles of the freedom to read and 
declares that whenever censorship is involved no book and/or li- 
brary material shall be removed from the library save under the 
orders of a court of competent jurisdiction. 
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5. This board adopts and declares that it will adhere to and sup- 
port: 
a. The Library Bill of Rights, and 
b. The Freedom to Read Statement adopted by the American Li- 
brary Association, both of which are made a part hereof.2 
It should also be understood that the role of a governing body and 
that of the librarian are separate and distinct. The librarian's function 
is administration as opposed to the board's, which is policy making. 
The distinction is analogous to that between a board of directors and 
a manager. 
It is also essential that governing bodies of libraries realize that 
their obligation is not to themselves, but to the community, and that 
this obligation precludes imposing their own prejudices, preferences, 
or views, It should be clear to all governing bodies of all public li- 
braries, including those commissioned to govern the state libraries, 
that censorship of any form is abhorrent in a free society. A people 
haunted by fear, crushed by oppression or ruled by a dictator might 
accept censorship as did some of the people of other nations who 
saw the great burning of the books, but despite the cries from the 
conservatives, the do-gooder, the self-righteous, the bigot, and the 
well-meaning, no American with any sense of history and an under- 
standing of the value of liberty will tolerate censorship. Rights of 
individuals in a rapidly growing society do seem to shrink. The very 
number of people makes the exercise of rights more difficult. Rights, 
however, must be defended more and must even be cherished more; 
if man is to live free despite the pressure to conform, all of his rights 
must be defended, especially his right to read. 
Basically, censorship attacks come in four broad categories: politi- 
cal, religious, social, and pornographic. There are those who would 
suppress political viewpoints in order that their own might prevail, 
there are those who would suppress religious ideas in order that their 
own creed might gain ascendancy, there are those who would sup- 
press racial and social theories in order that their own might gain 
credence, there are those who would suppress what they are pleased 
to call obscene, pornographic, lurid, or indecent literature in order 
that they might impose upon society their own views of morality. One 
might be inclined to admit that there is a great deal of garbage being 
passed off as literature, but one should also remember what Thomas 
Jefferson had to say about censorship: 
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I am really mortified to be told that, in the United States of 
America, . , . a question about the sale of a book can be carried 
before the civil magistrate , . , are we to have a censor whose 
imprimatur shall say what books may be sold, and what we may 
buy? . , . shall a layman, simple as ourselves, set up  his reason as 
the rule for what we ought to read , , , ? It is an insult to our citi- 
zens to question whether they are rational beings or not.3 
Thomas Jefferson championed the right of free expression even for 
those who opposed his political ideas. So strong was his opposition 
to a constitution without a bill of rights that he originally opposed 
the adoption of the Constitution because it included no safeguards 
of rights, though he was eventually persuaded that the Constitution 
should be adopted as written, and a bill of rights added as soon as 
possible. Jefferson’s Virginia Statute of religious freedom was the 
model for the freedom of religion clause in the First Amendment. 
Jefferson, one of the best-educated men of his day, undoubtedly knew 
of Socrates and Euripides and the trouble which they had with cen- 
sorship, though it did not bear that name then. He undoubtedly knew 
of the clash of religions in the first centuries of the Christian era which 
gave rise to bitter attempts at thought suppression when the early 
Christians were tortured and put to death to force them to worship 
the emperor, a sacrilegious act in their view. He undoubtedly was 
aware that as soon as Theodosius made Christianity the sole legal 
religion of the Roman Empire, the Christians began persecuting the 
pagans. A man of his learning would have been familiar with Arius, 
Origen, Donatus, Pelagus, and Nestorius, all of them victims of ortho- 
dox intolerance, and all major thinkers and writers of Western civiliza- 
tion. He must have known of Roger Bacon’s scientific experimenta- 
tions which earned him the enmity of his Franciscan brethren and 
landed him in jail, of Pierre AbBlard’s theological treatise which was 
condemned at the Council of Sens and destroyed, of Vesalius hounded 
into abandoning his brilliant anatomical researches, of Galileo forced 
to recant his subversive belief that the earth revolves around the sun, 
and of Lorenzo Valla persecuted because his examination of the dona- 
tion of Constantine had exposed it as spurious. Though men tend to 
forget the lessons of history today, fortunately for us this was not so 
with our forefathers who understood that our world would be in- 
finitely poorer if these men had been silenced, as it is infinitely poorer 
because of the works which persecution prevented them from writing. 
Article I of the Bill of Rights provides that “Congress shall make 
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no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; 
or the rights of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.” The protection of certain 
rights, including freedom of speech, appeared so important to the 
founding fathers that this article is the only one which expressedly 
forbids Congress to make laws. 
It is true that rights are not absolute. For example, no one has the 
right falsely to cry “fire” in a crowded building, nor can anyone slander 
another, but in both examples the exercise of right caused harm, and 
in both instances the harm could be punished because it was a prov- 
able effect. In 1919, Article XVIII was enacted, banning the manu- 
facture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors. This great social 
experiment was terminated in 1933, when it was found that the sale 
and transportation of intoxicating beverages apparently could not be 
controlled. No sane person will deny that there is a causal relation- 
ship between drinking and behavioral patterns. It should also be 
noted that approximately 50 percent of the fatal accidents on high- 
ways can be attributed to drinking. Of course no statistics are avail- 
able to indicate the rapes, attempted rapes, robberies and other anti- 
social acts which can be attributed to alcohol, nor how many un-
wanted pregnancies or how many unexpected consentual intimacies 
occur because of the influence of alcohol. Yet very few people today 
advocate a return to legislation which proved unenforceable. With 
reading, on the other hand, not only is it impossible to d e h e  por- 
nography or enforce laws against it, but its effects can neither be 
measured nor predicted. Two people may read the same thing and 
have entirely different reactions. What one period considers shocking 
will merely amuse the next; likewise, the mere bawdiness of one age 
will be filth to another. It is thus that the so-called “pornographic” 
books of a period have often become the classics of the next: witness 
Madam Bovary, Lady Chatterley’s Lover, and Ulysses. On the other 
hand, the Decameron, universally read in Chaucer’s day, contains 
passages that most modern editors prefer to leave in the original 
Italian. 
Censorship must first of all cope with the problem of fighting some- 
thing which defies definition and varies with every person, every area, 
and every period; it must also cope with this “something” without any 
firm basis for prohibition. It can be asked if there is a demonstrable 
causal relationship between reading and behavior patterns. If it were 
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possible to prove that antisocial sexual behavior such as rape and 
sexual assault followed the reading of pornography, then laws might 
properly attempt to regulate something which, as of now, is still legally 
undefinable (though those laws might prove as unenforceable as pro-
hibition). If, however, no relationship can be established between 
“pornography” and antisocial sexual behavior, such legislation is purely 
an attempt to impose a certain moral view on society. 
The effect of words, written or spoken, on behavior is hard to trace. 
For centuries, churches have taught, led, expounded, and preached to 
convince their disciples of the creed which they professed. No one 
can say what effect this teaching had on the mind of the faithful, but 
one might well question the existence of a causal relationship between 
the “believer’s” behavior and the beliefs or doctrines taught, partic- 
ularly that of charity, Yet this religious effort to influence behavior 
has been sustained over centuries. In the case of pornography, no 
study to date has proved that exposure to pornography has caused 
antisocial behavior. A most thorough recent study was conducted in 
1969 by the department of psychiatry at the University of Chicago’s 
Pritzker School of Medicine. 
Questionnaires in the University of Chicago survey went to 7,500 
psychiatrists and psychoanalysts (about half of those listed in the di- 
rectory of the American Psychiatric Association) and to more than 
3,000 psychologists whose listing in the directory of the American 
Psychological Association indicated experience with patients. More 
than 3,400 professionals in the mental health field responded to the 
questionnaire. 
Since words such as “pornography” and “antisocial sexual behavior” 
may have different meanings to different people, the questionnaire 
included definitions of both which were to be used in responding. 
Pornography was defined in the words of Supreme Court Justice 
Potter Stewart in the case of Ginzberg v. The United States. That 
definition indicates in part that pornography includes “photographs, 
both still and motion picture, with no pretense of artistic value” de- 
picting sexual acts. Comic strips, pamphlets, and booklets “with no 
pretense of literary value” are also included in the definition. 
Antisocial sexual behavior was defined for the questionnaire as 
“that behavior which violates the rights or invades the privacy of 
some person or persons and is of an obviously sexual nature.” Ex- 
amples include rape and sexual assault. 
Responses to individual questions show: 
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-80 percent of the psychiatrists and psychologists had never en- 
countered any cases in which pornography was a causal factor in 
antisocial sexual behavior. 
-7.4 percent did encounter cases in which they were somewhat 
convinced of a link between pornography and antisocial behavior. 
-9.4 percent had cases in which they suspected but were not 
convinced of a link. 
-83 .7  percent believed persons exposed to pornography are no 
more likely to engage in antisocial sexual acts than persons not 
exposed. 
-57 .9  percent, however, did not believe exposure to pornography 
tends to act as a valve for antisocial sexual impulses. However, 38.9 
percent believe pornography does help decrease the likelihood of 
antisocial sexual behavior. 
-62 percent did not believe pornography which includes violence 
is any more likely to lead to antisocial sexual behavior. 
-60.4 percent did not think pornography can be therapeutically 
useful for people experiencing fears of sexual impotency. 
-61.4 percent did not think seeing violence on television or in 
the movies acts as catharsis to reduce the tendency for people to 
actually act out violent impulses. 
-49 .4  percent did not believe violence, when publicly depicted 
in various forms, tends to create a permissive atmosphere within 
which individuals have a greater likelihood of acting out their own 
violent impulses. 
-76.2 percent did not believe watching violence on television or 
in the movies tends to excite some people or frequently lead to 
violent behavior. 
-65.5 percent did not feel eliminating censorship would reduce 
the desire for pornographic materials. 
- 8 6 . 1  percent believed people who vigorously try to suppress 
pornography are often motivated by unresolved sexual problems in 
their own characters. 
-64.9 percent believed censorship is socially harmful because it 
contributes to a climate of oppression and inhibition within which 
creative individuals cannot express themselves adequately. 
-55.7 percent believed some form of censorship should be ap- 
plied to pornography, and depiction of violence (53.7 percent), but 
not erotically arousing materials exclusive of pornography (90.4 
percent ) , 
-69.4 percent believed there is a real danger that censorship will 
suppress true art along with trash. 
-70.6 percent believed the real problem in censorship is in finding 
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persons qualified to exercise their judgment over the reading and 
viewing materials of other^.^ 
In the face of such negative evidence the only plausible explanation 
for any attempt to impose restrictions on reading is the desire of the 
would-be censors to impose their own religious morality upon others. 
Since moral beliefs are either a part of religious faith, or are, for 
atheists and agnostics, a form of religion, the attempt to impose one’s 
moral views on others flies directly in the face of the prohibition con- 
tained in the First Amendment of the Constitution. Unless a casual 
relationship can be demonstrated, the continued attempts at censor- 
ship are attempts to regulate beliefs, thoughts, and ideas which are 
highly personal and cannot be regulated by the law. 
Speaking through Justice Black, the Supreme Court condemned the 
imposition of a particular form of prayer. 
By the time of the adoption of the Constitution, our history shows 
that there was a widespread awareness among many Americans of 
the dangers of a union of Church and State. I . . The First Amend- 
ment was added to the Constitution to stand as a guarantee that 
neither the power nor the prestige of the Federal Government would 
be used to control, support or influence the kinds of prayer the 
American people can say-that the people’s religions must not be 
subjected to the pressures of government for change each time a 
new political administration is elected to office. Under that Amend- 
ment’s prohibition against governmental establishment of religion, 
as reinforced by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
government in this country, be it state or Federal, is without power 
to prescribe by law any particular form of prayer which is to be 
used as an official prayer in carrying on any program of govern- 
mentally sponsored religious activityO5 
In Torcaso v. Watkins, the Supreme Court stated: “We repeat and 
again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can 
constitutionally force a person ‘to profess a belief or disbelief in any 
religion.’ Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose require- 
ments which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can 
aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against 
those religions founded on different beliefs.” Certainly imposing a 
moral viewpoint upon society is more serious than imposing a prayer 
since it is equivalent to imposing a way of life. 
The Supreme Court, in a landmark decision, ruled in 1969 that 
the possession of obscene material in the privacy of the home is not 
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a crime. Speaking for the court, Judge Thurgood Marshall said, “If 
the First Amendment means anything, it means that a state has no 
business telling a man, sitting alone in his house, what books he may 
read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage 
rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s 
minds.” The Justice continued: “Georgia asserts the right to protect 
the individual’s mind from the effects of obscenity,” but 
We are not certain that this argument amounts to anything more 
than the assertion that the state has the right to control the moral 
content of the person’s thoughts. To some, this may be a noble 
purpose, but it is wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the 
First Amendment. . . . Nor is it relevant that obscenity in general, 
or the particular films before the Court, are arguably devoid in any 
ideological content. The line between the transmission of ideas and 
mere entertainment is much too elusive for this Court to draw, if 
indeed such a line can be drawn at all. . . . Whatever the power 
of the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to the 
public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the 
desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts. 
Perhaps recognizing this, Georgia asserts that exposure to ob- 
scenity may lead to deviant sexual behavior or crimes of sexual 
violence. There appears to be little empirical basis for that asser- 
tion. But more importantly, if the State is only concerned about 
literature inducing antisocial conduct, we believe that in the context 
of private consumption of ideas and information we should adhere 
to the view that “[a] among free men, the deterrents ordinarily to 
be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for 
violation of the law.” 
What is the difference between private and public consumption of 
ideas? The basic principle to remember is that “whatever the power 
of the state . . . it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the 
desirability of controlling a person’s thoughts.” It  should be unequivo- 
cally clear that laws in the American system can regulate only ex- 
ternal behavior and cannot attempt to dictate belief, ideas, and 
thoughts. However, intellectual freedom deals directly with thoughts, 
ideas, and beliefs, and censorship, including laws restricting access 
to any material, attempts to control thoughts, beliefs, and ideas. Such 
actions deny man the rights to which he is entitled since he cannot 
read what is not printed or what is withdrawn from circulation. Cen- 
sorship therefore affects directly not only constitutional rights, but 
also civil rights. Furthermore, it uses unconstitutional means when 
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it stops the circulation of written works. Any deliberate interference 
with this circulation-by private persons, public officials, or the law 
itself-is an abridgment of the freedom of the press, an action directly 
prohibited by the First Amendment. It follows that every man un- 
deniably has the freedom to read, or to reject, whatever he wishes. 
By the same token he has no right to dictate what others may read. 
To do so denies them their freedom to read and their right to read, 
both of which are constitutionally guaranteed. 
I t  is important to recognize that value judgments are highly sub- 
jective. When an individual, a group, an official, a legislature or con- 
gress attempts to impose its subjective judgment upon the majority, 
it in fact denies the majority a freedom indispensable for the develop- 
ment and enlargement of their thinking. Thoughts are subject only 
to voluntary restrictions, such as religion or morality which seek to 
impose and which the mind can accept or reject. It seems pertinent 
to ask the intent of placing within one article the prohibition against 
the establishment of religion, as well as against abridging the freedom 
of speech, of the press, or the rights of the people to assemble or to 
petition. Is the juxtaposition accidental or intentional? If one con- 
siders the interrelationship of the freedoms guaranteed in this article, 
particularly those of speech, of the press, and of religion, the reason 
for the juxtaposition becomes obvious. The right to speak, the right 
to think, and the prohibition against imposing one’s morals upon 
others, are obviously facets of the larger freedom, intellectual freedom. 
All governing bodies of libraries must therefore recognize that every 
adult has the right to read any printed matter-books, articles, papers, 
magazines, or pamphlets-and that any attempts to prevent his doing 
so have been banned by the Supreme Court. Today, as Charles 
Rembar, a distinguished member of the New York bar and the author 
of The End of Obscenity, points out, “so far as books are concerned, 
then, the affront to intellectual freedom no longer comes from the 
law. On the contrary, the primary rule of the law is in defense of 
intellectual freedom. The affront comes from three sources: from gov- 
ernment officials acting against the law, from non-governmental pres- 
sure groups, and from ourselves.” The self-censorship, as Rembar 
points out, does not ultimately come from within the self, but is created 
in great part by the surrounding culture which includes legal stand- 
ards. There is, therefore, an interaction between self-censorship and 
legal censorship: courts are influenced by public opinion and public 
opinion tends to accept more readily what the courts have labelled 
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acceptable. This self-censorship, however, being the most subtle, is 
the hardest to pinpoint and to oppose. Rembar points out that the 
library of the Harvard Club does not own any book Norman Mailer, 
a distinguished Harvard alumnus, wrote between The Naked and the 
Dead and The Armies of the Night. Was it literary taste or self-censor- 
ship that has kept The Deer Park from the shelves of the Harvard 
Club? 
Self-censorship may be too subtle to be effectively coped with, but 
there is usually nothing subtle in the censorship exercised by govern- 
ment officials. Yet no one has the right to remove a book from the 
shelves of a library or to order it removed unless the volume has been 
declared obscene by a court of competent jurisdiction. As a matter 
of fact, as Rembar points out, when officials 
apply the pressure on their own, without recourse to legal process, 
the law is clear that they are acting unlawfully, and the courts will 
enjoin them. Then there are cases where enforcement officials em- 
ploy legal process, but in a way which is itself a form of suppression; 
here it has been established that people may not be silenced except 
after a court has considered the matter. . . . in general it can be 
said that officials who seek to interfere with free expression on their 
own-that is, prior to a judicial determination that the book should 
be suppressed-will be stopped by the courts.* 
The bodies governing libraries must remember that no book is obscene 
on its face, no book can be prejudged obscene by an individual, and 
no book can be held obscene until it has been so declared by a court 
of competent jurisdiction. 
A librarian does not have to yield to that kind of pressure, and 
library governing bodies are there to protect him and back him. 
Should a librarian be fired for refusing to yield to pressure, the firing 
may be actionable under the Civil Rights Act which states: 
Every person who, under cover of any statute, ordinance, regula- 
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes 
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redress.9 
This way of looking at civil rights does bring about a new twist 
in legal thinking. Carrying it to its logical conclusion means as Rembar 
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states, “that the selection of books is itself part of the speech and press 
the First Amendment protects, and that librarians are entitled to 
personal protection because they have a special function under the 
First Amendment. But is this not valid? Freedom of expression in- 
volves freedom of communication. It is not much good to be free to 
speak if you cannot make yourself heard. Public libraries are an im- 
mensely important link in the chain of communication.” lo 
It should be pointed out that while those freedoms guaranteed by 
the Constitution have so far been held to apply to adults, there are 
the so-called “variable obscenity laws” which apply to juveniles. Stated 
simply, as quoted as Ginsberg v. New York the Supreme Court ruled 
that a State may regulate the dissemination to juveniles of, and their 
access to materials objectionable to them, but which a state clearly 
could not regulate as to adults.ll The effect of the Ginsberg case is 
that a publication which would not be obscene if sold to an adult 
may yet be obscene-and thus constitutionally unprotected-when 
sold to a minor. It should be noted that in the Ginsberg case the court 
did not decide whether the material involved was actually obscene 
for minors under seventeen since that point was not specifically raised. 
Since the court upheld the New York statute involved in the Ginsberg 
case, many states have adopted Ginsberg type laws, and it is quite 
likely that more states will follow. Generally, these variable obscenity 
laws prohibit the sale or loan for monetary considerations, to minors 
of materials defined in various statutes. The age of the minor vanes, 
but generally is seventeen. 
It is quite one thing to recognize, for voting purposes, twenty-one 
years as a requirement. By the same token it is rather easy to set the 
age of eighteen as the legal age in which one might purchase a drink. 
I t  is, however, quite different to set the age at which one may be 
given reading materials. It is obvious that in many instances young 
adults are more capable of handling sophisticated material than adults 
in their thirties, forties, and fifties. Yet the Iaws do not take different 
levels of maturity into consideration, which obviously is unjust. 
It is apparent that we will live with these “variable obscenity” 
statutes for some time. So far criminal prosecution of librarians is un-
likely because most statutes provide that they would only apply to 
sales or loans “for monetary consideration.” But the governing bodies 
of libraries, as proper guardians of the constitutional freedoms and 
as recipients of a public trust, should check these laws and make 
certain that they except libraries and library personnel. It is hoped 
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that the threat to intellectual freedom to others would concern them 
also and that they would broaden the exceptions as has been done 
in Minnesota. Ervin Gaines, Director of Libraries of Minneapolis, 
prepared for the Minnesota Library Association the following excep- 
tions which have been enacted into law: 
(a )  Recognized and established schools, churches, museums, medi- 
cal clinics and physicians, hospitals, public libraries, governmental 
agencies or quasi governmental sponsored organizations, and per- 
sons acting in their capacity as employees or agents of such or- 
ganization. For the purpose of this section “recognized and estab- 
lished” shall mean an organization or agency having a full-time 
faculty and diversified curriculum in the case of a school; a church 
affiliated with a national or regional denomination; a licensed physi- 
cian or psychiatrist or clinic of licensed physicians or psychiatrists; 
and in all other exempt organizations shall refer only to income 
tax exempted organizations which are supported by tax funds or 
supported by at least one-third publicly donated funds. 
( b )  Individuals in a parental relationship with the minor.12 
The adoption of such exceptions to the laws is necessary to give 
librarians the assurance that they are backed by their governing 
bodies. Library associations should vigorously assist in the passage 
of such exemptions. 
The governing bodies of all libraries must realize that it is not only 
unreasonable but impossible to expect librarians to act as censors. 
By now it should be obvious that librarians-or anyone else-should 
not act as censors to adults, and they cannot fulfill these functions 
toward minors. Unlike parents who spend a great deal of time with 
their children, and even teachers who know children well, librarians 
cannot judge the child’s ability in general, his reading ability in par- 
ticular, nor his level of intelligence, nor can they evaluate the socio- 
logical and psychological factors which enter into the child‘s life. 
Librarians likewise are not usually familiar with the family back- 
ground of the child which greatly influences the child’s level of under- 
standing and his ability to cope with his reading. Parents are the only 
persons who should properly say what their children can or cannot 
read. 
The grave difficulty which presents itself here is that in too many 
instances children are far more advanced than their parents. Par- 
ticularly in this day of modern education, it is not unusual to see very 
young children with a great deal more intellectual sophistication than 
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their parents, especially in rural areas, in the inner core cities, and in 
economically depressed areas. But this problem, serious as it is, is no 
reason to shift the responsibility for selecting the reading of young 
adults to the librarians and expecting them to become censors. More- 
over, the number of trained librarians in any given library is quite in- 
su5cient to do the counseling which would be necessary if censorship 
were to work effectively. 
The number of professional librarians varies from library to li-
brary, but the paucity of professionally trained librarians in any given 
library should convince any reasonable person, that it is humanly 
and physically impossible for the professional librarians to counsel 
personally every child and at the same time perform his multitudinous 
duties. Indeed, too many of our so-called libraries have no trained 
personnel at all. It is unthinkable that a totally untrained person 
should be given such responsibility. A review of the total number of 
unbudgeted, but needed, librarians should be proof enough, but even 
if the personnel were available to fill these unbudgeted positions, 
librarians would still have neither the time nor the training to act as 
censors. 
The variable obscenity laws raise another problem, that of the 
rights of juveniles. It should be remembered that while the rights 
of juveniles vary from state to state, their rights to “due process” 
have been upheld, as were their rights to counsel. Furthermore some 
of the traditional procedural rights must be followed by juvenile 
courts if the basic rights of children to fair treatment are to be as- 
sured. In 1969 the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Fortas, 
in the matter entitled In Re Gault, said, “Departures from established 
principles of due process have frequently resulted not in enlightened 
procedure, but in arbitrariness. . . . it would be extraordinary if our 
Constitution did not require the procedural regularity and the ex-
ercise of care implied in the phrase ‘due process.’ Under our Con- 
stitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo 
court.” l3 Further, Justice Fortas said: 
A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found 
to be “delinquent” and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years 
is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution. , , . The child 
“requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceed- 
ings against him.” , . . We conclude that the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment requires that in respect of proceedings 
to determine delinquency which may result in commitment to an 
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institution in which the juvenile’s freedom is curtailed, the child 
and his parent must be notified of the child’s right to be represented 
by counsel retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, 
that counsel will be appointed to represent the child.13 
The court also pointed out: “We conclude that the constitutional 
privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles 
as it is with respect to adults.”13 Furthermore in February 1969, the 
Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District 
et al., held that high school and junior high school students had the 
right to engage in speech, notwithstanding the school authorities’ 
regulations to the contrary, provided that their speech did not amount 
to a disruption of the educational process. Justice Fortas, speaking for 
the court, said: “The District Court recognized that the wearing of 
an armband for the purpose of expressing certain views is the type 
of symbolic act this is within the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment. As we shall discuss, the wearing of armbands in the 
circumstances of this case was entirely divorced from actual or po-
tential disruptive conduct by those participating in it. It was closely 
akin to ‘pure speech‘ which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to 
comprehensive protection under the First Amendment.” l4 In view of 
these decisions and the constant evolution of the law it is to be hoped 
that the rights of “juveniles” may one day be recognized as entitling 
them, certainly at a much earlier age than is now specified in most of 
our variable obscenity laws, to read any material they choose. 
The usual fear expressed is that material thought to be “obscene” 
might fall into the hands of young adults and encourage them to de- 
linquency or sexual experimentation. Yet actual study shows that 
delinquents typically are non-readers. A 1958 study by Brown Uni- 
versity psychologists concluded: “there is no reliable evidence that 
reading or other fantasy activities leads to antisocial behavior.” And 
Justice William 0. Douglas pointed out in Freedom of the Mind: 
“We know from researches in this age-old field that sex literature is 
not an important factor in arousing youth‘s sexual desire. Adults are 
the ones most afflicted, and men more than women. The male who 
is commonly aroused is an adult in the upper social groups. So the 
desire to protect either juveniles or society turns out to be a pretense. 
The real purpose is to make the public live up to the censor’s code 
of morality.” l3 
It  can be also pointed out that millions of devotees of James Bond 
and Mike Hammer remain law abiding citizens. In fact, it has been 
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argued that novels of sex and violence provide a vicarious outlet for 
tensions, infinitely preferable to direct action, As William C. Kvaraceus 
states: “with the younger readers, it may be more strategic to let 
them experience an illicit love affair in the fantasy of Pezjton Place 
rather than the back seat of a parked car in their home town.” l6 
One more word should be spoken to reassure those who fear for 
the young adult or for children. Freedom may be the greatest safety 
for our young people, for it may be better for young people to be 
prepared by books to meet the evil they will undoubtedly encounter 
sooner or later. It may also be better for them to learn about sex in 
books with a literary value than in back-street under-the-counter por- 
nography. We apparently cannot stop the supply of such contraband 
material. I t  will always be available for the curious and for the emo-
tionally disturbed. It is not pornography, we have noted, which causes 
emotional imbalance, but emotional imbalance which impels a child 
or an adult to seek pornography. 
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